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DNA Fingerprinting and the Right to Inviolability of the Body and 
Bodily Integrity in the Netherlands: Convincing Evidence and 






The paper uses insights from the so-called rape in disguise case study to describe 
forensic DNA practices in the Netherlands in late 1980s. It describes how 
“reliabilities” of forensic DNA practices were achieved. One such reliability – 
convincing evidence – proliferates body parts through time and space. Then, attention 
shifts to the individual who was suspected of having committed the rape. He was 
asked to deliver tissue for DNA typing, but refused to do so. Hence DNA typing 
could not be used to connect the suspect to a cervical smear collected from the body 
of the victim. His refusal and the legal impossibility to use force to obtain his 
biological material led first to questions in the Dutch parliament and then to the Dutch 
forensic DNA law. Other legal measures enacted after this are also described. I argue 
that, by means of the various Dutch forensic DNA laws and new forensic genetic 
techniques, the application of forensic DNA practices have shifted from identification 
and evidence to a tool for criminal investigation and prevention of future crimes. In 
the final part of the paper, the right to inviolability of the body and its synonym 
bodily integrity are emphasised. I argue that despite the various forensic DNA laws, 





Since the invention of the so-called DNA fingerprint by geneticist Alec Jeffreys and 
his colleagues in the mid 1980s,1 it has been possible to individualise persons 
genetically, much as dactyloscopy (fingerprinting) is used to individualise people 
physically. It has proven to be a very important forensic technique; DNA typing is 
considered the new gold standard of forensic evidence in the court of law. When 
DNA fingerprinting was introduced to the Dutch judiciary, it turned out that the law 
was not compatible with this new technique, as a suspect could refuse to cooperate 
with DNA typing. Hence, DNA fingerprinting could only be used with the consent of 
a suspect; if a suspect refused to deliver tissue, DNA typing could not be used to 
connect the suspect to, for instance, a cervical smear collected from the body of a 
victim of rape. Such a situation happened in the rape in disguise case that shall be 
described in this paper.2 Information from the criminal file of that case is used here to 
describe the organisation of Dutch forensic DNA practices in the late 1980s.3 More 
specifically, three forms of “reliability” of forensic DNA practices – reproducibility, 
legal evidence, convincing evidence – are described. I argue that body parts of 
individuals whose tissue will be DNA typed proliferate through time and space as the 
result of convincing evidence. After introducing the case and describing the 
achievement of reliable forensic DNA, I explain how the case could not be solved as 
the suspect refused to deliver blood or saliva for DNA typing. His refusal and the 
legal impossibility to use force to obtain his biological material led first to questions 
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in Dutch Parliament and then to the Dutch forensic DNA law. Other legal measures 
enacted after this will also be described. I argue that, by means of the various Dutch 
forensic DNA laws and new forensic genetic techniques, the application of forensic 
DNA practices shifted from identification and evidence to a tool for criminal 
investigation and prevention of future crimes. These shifts in applicability have 
repercussions for the legal principles that organise relations between the State and 
civilians. One such legal measure is the right to inviolability of the body, which is a 
synonym for bodily integrity. This legal concept is understood currently as the right 
not to be touched by the authorities. The argument presented in this paper is that 
bodily integrity of body parts proliferated through time and space is jeopardised. 
 
Rape in disguise 
 
In one of the southern Dutch provinces a young woman was raped in the late 1980s. 
The perpetrator was disguised through wearing a costume, hence the name of the 
case.4 The rape was investigated by the police. Various forensic techniques were 
applied, among them the novel DNA fingerprint technique. After the victim was 
found she was brought to the hospital where she was physically examined by a 
medical doctor. A cervical smear was taken and other biological material like pubic 
hairs were collected. Considering the nature of the crime, it was expected that the 
collected tissue and traces contained material that belonged to the alleged perpetrator. 
Reference material from the victim was also collected, so as to be able to discriminate 
between material that belongs to the victim and alleged perpetrator. As the rape 
appeared to have a similar modus operandi as another rape committed in the same 
region a year earlier, forensic analysts produced, at the request of the public 
prosecutor, DNA fingerprints from the cervical smears collected from both victims. 
By comparing the DNA fingerprints of blood collected from both victims with the 
DNA fingerprints of the cervical smears the forensic analysts were able to reconstruct 
two DNA fingerprints from each cervical smear. In both cases, the DNA fragments 
found that did not belong to the two victims matched, making it very probable that the 
DNA fingerprints originated from the same individual. Such a match is expressed in a 
statistical number called the likelihood ratio, which indicates the odds that a matching 
DNA fingerprint originates from two individuals. In this case the found likelihood 
ratio was 1:8,000, meaning that one in 8,000 individuals will statistically have the 
same DNA fingerprint.5  
 
A statistical number like 1:8,000 is hard to neglect for police officers, judges, and 
public prosecutors; a high likelihood ratio translates a match into a scientific and 
hence “reliable” fact. But reliability of evidence is about more than statistical 
outcomes. In this section, I discuss various notions of “reliability” relating to forensic 
DNA practices. Reliability is in quotation marks not because the reliability of forensic 
DNA practices will be questioned, but because this reliability is achieved in different 
ways.6 In this paper, DNA is considered as evidence resulting from (at least) three 
areas: technoscience, law, and judiciary. In each area, practitioners work according to 
their own rules, logic and merits, which imply different kinds of materials, norms, 
standards, expertise, knowledge, and settings, and hence produce different kinds of 
reliability.  
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Within a forensic laboratory, reliability is subject to a regime of reproducibility. To 
be able to reproduce results it is of the utmost importance that an analyst’s work is 
standardised, that proper protocols and research strategies are deployed, and that 
dates, times, lot numbers, machines, techniques, and expiration dates of used 
chemicals are conscientiously written into a laboratory diary. Being subjected to a 
regime of reproducibility also means that analysts work in sterile conditions to 
prevent contamination of crime related samples. Hence, achieving reliability is also a 
result of cleaning, decontamination, and wearing rubber gloves. Techno-scientific 
results have to be communicated to jurists, i.e. lawyers, judges, or public prosecutors. 
By means of this communication, the results travel from a scientific practice to 
juridical practice. Jurists have a different educational background; they are lay 
persons when it concerns understanding and interpreting DNA profiles. Translation 
and application of techno-scientific data into the judiciary must be trustworthy. 
Trustworthy translation and application is achieved by various legal arrangements in 
the Netherlands. For example, the Dutch forensic institute (Nederlands Forensisch 
Instituut, NFI) resides directly under the Minister of Justice, and the tasks of the NFI 
are circumscribed in Dutch law. Forensic evidence gains legal status only if it is 
produced in forensic laboratories with specific international accreditation; only two 
Dutch forensic DNA laboratories have such accreditation.7 Forensic experts are 
responsible for reporting the results to the judiciary; a legal precondition to become a 
forensic expert is that they are sworn-in. Transforming techno-scientific results into 
trustworthy evidence is achieved through legal arrangements and thus creates legal 
evidence as a second form of reliable evidence. Besides being legal, evidence needs 
to be convincing, too. It is up to the judge to become convinced of the relevance of 
evidence in the case at hand; a demonstrably unbroken chain of evidence enables the 
judge to make such a decision. The chain of evidence is the result of describing, 
registering, and administrating all steps from collecting tissue until the presentation of 
it as evidence in the court of law, giving the judge the opportunity to trace back all 
phases of production of evidence. Therefore, the chain of evidence has to be 
transparent.8 If a chain of evidence is not demonstrably unbroken, a judge or a lawyer 
will doubt the origins of either the tissue found at the crime scene or a sample taken 
from a suspect. Hence, it is not that evidence is convincing; it is that it has to be made 
convincing.9 In a simplified, linear mode (fig. 1), two chains of evidence (the 
“suspect chain” and the “crime scene chain”) can be bound together by a match. 
 
 











As I will argue in the present paper, making evidence convincing has repercussions 
for the legal protection of body parts as separated but undividable parts of an 
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individual and his or her body. As a result, the legal concept of the right for 
inviolability of the body and its synonym bodily integrity will be problematised.10 
Although the body of the victim is severely violated, the body of the suspect will be 
the focus of this paper, as that body is a starting point for examining the legal concept 
of the right to inviolability of the body.  
 
The criminal investigation in the rape in disguise case led to an individual who 
became suspected of having committed both rapes. He was taken into custody on the 
basis of circumstantial evidence that related him to the rapes. The suspect was asked 
to deliver saliva and (pubic) hairs for comparison with samples secured during the 
physical examinations of both victims. The pubic hairs of the suspect matched those 
of the secured material. Blood types can be extracted from saliva, and the extracted 
blood types matched those of the tissue secured from the bodies of the victims. This is 
not to say that a sound link was established between the suspect and crimes, as the 
discriminatory value of these tests was considered very low. However, the results 
were deemed important as they did not exonerate the suspect as the possible 
perpetrator. On the other hand, there was also circumstantial evidence available 
warranting the suspect’s claim to innocence. He did not match the physical 
description that both victims gave of the perpetrator, he was not identified by the 
victims during an Oslo-test, and they did not identify the voice of the suspect with 
that of the perpetrator. If the suspect’s DNA fingerprint could be compared to that 
already produced from samples collected from the victims’ bodies, then the juridical 
stalemate could be settled. Since the suspect pleaded innocence, the result could 
exonerate him as possible perpetrator. But when he was asked to deliver blood for 
DNA typing, the suspect refused to cooperate. 
 
Inviolability of the Body I: Boundaries of Bodies 
 
After the suspect’s refusal to give blood for DNA typing, the investigating judge ruled 
that the suspect should be bodily searched in order to obtain blood. The suspect, 
together with his lawyer, appealed to the order in summary proceedings. They made 
an appeal to the right of inviolability of the body. Inviolability of the body is a 
fundamental right in the Dutch legislature; it is enshrined in article 11 of the Dutch 
Constitution: “Everyone shall have the right to inviolability of his person, without 
prejudice to restrictions laid down by or pursuant to Act of Parliament”.11 In Dutch 
law, there was, at that time, no legal exception that made it possible to violate a 
suspect’s body to take tissue against his will – hence the appeal judge’s decision that 
blood could not be taken. Thereafter, the investigating judge ruled that the suspect 
should be bodily searched for a second time, now to obtain saliva. During both 
summary proceedings, legal concepts like insides and outsides of bodies, force, and 
tissue were articulated. Within the Dutch Constitution there is room for violating a 
body only “by or pursuant to Act of Parliament”. In the penal code it states that tissue 
can be removed from the body. Here, “from the body” is articulated as from the 
outside, like on the skin or on clothes. However, “outside” is a discursive constructed 
category, as individuals who are suspected of smuggling drugs or weapons in “natural 
openings” can be searched in mouth, rectum, or vagina. So “natural openings” can be 
violated if a bodily search focuses on body-strange objects. To collect saliva from the 
mouth means that tissue is taken away from a natural opening. Yet, this was found not 
to be in accordance with the existing legislation and jurisprudence, and as a result the 
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judge decided that mandatory taking of saliva from the mouth could not lead to legal 
evidence.12 This jurisprudence settled the legal position of blood and saliva as 
“private”.13 They were inaccessible to the public authorities, and as a result DNA 
typing could not be applied to connect the suspect to both rapes.14 The suspect was 
kept in custody until the charges against him were brought to the judge. As there was 
no evidence that directly linked the suspect to the rapes, the judge concluded that it 
was neither convincingly nor legally proven that the suspect was the perpetrator. 
Therefore, the charges against the suspect were not found proven and he was released 
from custody. The rape in disguise case has never been solved.  
 
Inviolability of the Body II: Making the Private Public 
 
The process of jurisprudence through which tissues were shown to have a private 
status led to questions in the Dutch Parliament. Some members of the Parliament 
asked the Minister of Justice to change the law in such a way that in future cases 
tissue could be taken from a suspect with force.15 The minister reacted positively to 
the request, and installed a special forensic DNA commission, “Commissie Moons” 
(hereafter the “Moons Commission”), which was named after its chairman. The 
Moons Commission delivered a law proposal early 1991.16 Three years later, in 
September 1994, the Forensic DNA typing law was enacted. Some elements of this 
Forensic DNA law will be discussed below, followed by an analysis of other laws 
relating to forensic DNA laws which came into force in 1994. 
 
Forensic DNA Typing Law – 1994 
 
The Netherlands was the first country in the world to introduce specific forensic DNA 
legislation.17 The law sought to ensure the reliability of forensic DNA practices, and 
it described in precise language and legal measures how tissue should be obtained 
from suspects and how the privacy of suspects and victims was to be protected. 
However, the most important achievement of this specific law was that it was no 
longer possible for suspects to make an appeal to the constitutional right to 
inviolability of the body in all situations. Since invading a body by breaching the skin 
was considered a serious violation of the legal concept of the “right to inviolability of 
the body”, high thresholds were introduced. Tissue like blood in the body or saliva in 
the mouth could only be obtained by the public authorities for DNA typing if and 
when a person was suspected of having committed a crime with a penalty of a 
maximum of eight years or more, if there were serious suspicions against the suspect, 
when the suspect persisted in refusing to cooperate after being asked to do so several 
times, and if DNA evidence was essential for solving the case at hand.18 In practice, 
these criteria meant that the body of individuals, suspected of having committed 
serious and violent crimes like murder, manslaughter, and rape could be involuntarily 
violated in order to obtain tissue. The DNA fingerprint produced would be kept for a 
period of 30 years. The tissue collected was to be destroyed after a DNA fingerprint 
was produced, or as soon as the case at hand no longer required the availability of 
tissue. This last measure was to assure that tissue could not be used for other 
purposes, such as further genetic analysis.  
 
© ESRC Genomics Network.
            Genomics, Society and Policy 
            2006, Vol.2, No.3, pp.64-74 
 
_____________  69 
 
Genomics, Society and Policy, Vol.2 No.3 (2006) ISSN: 1746-5354 
Forensic DNA Typing in Criminal Proceedings Amendment – 2001 
 
Since the mid 1990s, the polymerase chain reaction (PCR) has been standard 
technology in (forensic) genetic laboratories. By means of PCR, specific DNA 
fragments (markers) can be reproduced outside a body. This meant that other tissues 
like saliva and hair roots could be used for forensic purposes. The availability of PCR 
was an important reason for an amendment to the 1994 law, the “Forensic DNA 
typing in criminal proceedings amendment” enacted in 2001.19 By means of the 2001 
amendment the initial thresholds of the 1994 law were lowered, largely for two 
reasons. First, it became possible to produce DNA profiles from saliva; hence bodies 
were violated to a lesser extent (as was stated by the Dutch Minister of Justice).20 
Second, the availability of PCR made it possible to look for new traces and clues 
(used cigarette tips, for example) at crime scenes. Therefore, PCR offered a way to 
use forensic DNA practices for more mundane crimes like burglary and car theft. 
Since the 2001 amendment, the number of cases in which tissue could be taken 
mandatorily increased significantly and consequently obtaining tissue from suspects 
became more mundane. To smooth the process of collection, some responsibilities 
were redistributed – the assignment of forensic experts to a case (redistributed from 
the investigating judge to the public prosecutor), for example, and the collection of 
saliva from consenting suspects (redistributed from medical doctors to trained police 
officers). Through the 2001 amendment, the right to inviolability of the body was 
articulated as the collection of tissue from the body.21 As a consequence, after the 
event of “touching” the body, collected tissue moved on to the legal realm of personal 
sphere and privacy elucidated by article 10 of the Dutch constitution: “Everyone shall 
have the right to respect for his privacy, without prejudice to restrictions laid down by 
or pursuant to Act of Parliament”.22 Hence, tissue and the DNA it contains have, 
since the 2001 amendment, been understood as personal data that jeopardises the 
personal sphere and privacy; the bodily integrity of biological material outside of 
bodies is legally no longer taken into account. Both the DNA profiles and the 
forensically collected biological material are now to be kept for a 20- or 30-year 
period.23 
 
Law on External Visible Characteristics – 2003 
 
After the 2001 amendment, legal measures to give room to forensic DNA practices 
followed quickly as the result of new forensic-genetic techniques and the political 
wish to use these techniques. One such technique is the use of markers on the male Y 
chromosome to make predictions about geographical descent of the donor of the 
tissue found at a crime scene. As the 1994 law and the 2001 amendment explicitly 
prohibited the usage of coding DNA, a new law had to be made that permitted 
forensic-genetic research on markers that code for external visible characteristics. In 
2003 the “Law on external visible characteristics” came into force.24 It referred to 
forensic-genetic research on biological traces found at crime scenes.25 By means of 
the law it has become a legal option to search for external visible characteristics 
(currently gender, and prediction about geographical descent by using DNA 
fragments situated on the male Y chromosome and parts of mitochondrial DNA 
(mtDNA)).26 These forensic-genetic technologies add a new function to forensic 
DNA practices: the data produced can enable investigations to focus on particular 
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(ethnic) groups. Similarly, forensic-genetic analyses can exonerate possible suspected 
groups.27  
 
The Dutch DNA Testing (Convicted Persons) Act – 2005 
 
Since 2005, it has been possible mandatorily to take the tissue of already convicted 
criminals (before it was only allowed to do so from suspects).28 According to, among 
others, politicians, the storage of DNA and DNA profiles for a 20- or 30-year period 
will prevent future crimes. Moreover, the stored DNA profiles can be used to search 
automatically for matches between crime scenes, and for matches between known 
persons and as yet unsolved crimes. The tissue is to be kept for future use, or to be 
profiled again if necessary. The DNA profiles produced are stored in the Dutch DNA 
database, which contains currently around 25,000 profiles of known individuals.29  
 
As this brief introduction to Dutch forensic-genetic legislation and techniques shows, 
the applicability of forensic DNA practices to criminal investigations has increased 
through new legislation and new techniques, and there is political agreement that 
these practices contribute to a safe society. The application of forensic DNA practices 
has gradually shifted from that of evidence and identification to criminal investigation 
and prevention of future crimes.30 In the process of giving room to new forensic DNA 
practices, the relationship between civilians and the authorities has changed, i.e. 
giving the state jurisdiction over intimate samples by redefining the right to 
inviolability of the body. But other legal principles that serve to protect individuals 
against use, abuse or misuse of violence by the state have been renegotiated too, like 
privacy, prohibition of discrimination (the 2003 law), presumption of innocence and 
motivation for criminal investigation by police (DNA databases, population wide 
DNA screenings), and the division between penal law for adults and adolescents (The 
Dutch DNA testing (convicted persons) act31). Discussion about the costs for legal 
principles of giving more room to forensic DNA practices have, with some 
exceptions,32 emerged only recently.33 
 
Inviolability of the body & bodily integrity 
 
For the sake of the argument presented in the paper, the “suspect chain” (fig.1) and 
“convincing evidence” will be examined more thoroughly here. As already stated, a 
judge can only become convinced that the presented evidence links the suspect to the 
crime through a demonstrably unbroken chain of evidence. In the practice of making 
evidence convincing, obtained tissue must always be accompanied by information 
about the individual it belongs to; simultaneously this package of tissue and 
information about identity (ID) has to travel back and forth from a body to a forensic 
laboratory without losing form.34 Hence a tissue/ID-package is constructed. As long 
as the tissue/ID-package functions, the tissue of a suspect can be made into 
convincing DNA evidence. However, as it has now been stipulated that tissue can be 
obtained from the “insides” of bodies if the legal criteria are met, it will be argued 
that a functioning tissue/ID-package jeopardises the donor’s right to inviolability of 
the body/bodily integrity and privacy. 
 
As long as the tissue and information about the individual are kept together, the tissue 
can be understood as belonging to the body of that individual. Hence, by means of the 
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tissue/ID-package, specific parts of bodies of individuals whose tissue will be DNA 
typed travel through time and space without losing form. Since those travelling body 
parts of individuals still are related to the donor by means of the tissue/ID-package, 
the right to inviolability of the body/bodily integrity (article 11 of the Dutch 
constitution) and privacy (article 10 of the Dutch constitution) of the donor are also at 
stake: information about the identity of the donor enacts the bodily integrity of 
travelling tissue; the flip side of this is that tissue contains genetic information which 
enacts the privacy of the individual.35 Once tissue has been obtained and translated 
into the tissue/ID-package it no longer belongs to the legal realm of article 11 of the 
constitution that governs bodily integrity. Instead, legal protection of the tissue/ID-
package moves to the privacy and personal information provisions outlined in article 
10 of the constitution, which can be problematic, as personal information should be 
understood as a produced DNA profile, a medical record, or a social security number. 
By applying genetic techniques on tissue and the DNA it contains, information can be 
revealed about the donor. Such information concerns body and mind, the donor and 
his or her family, an individual and population. The argument presented in this paper 
is that legislation designed to protect personal life is not sufficient to protect such 
problematic normative and ethical issues, especially if one takes in account that 
tissue/ID-packages are stored for a period of 20 or 30 years. Instead, protecting the 
tissue/ID-package as biological material and indivisible (if separate) part of an 
individual would be better organised by articulating and diverging bodily integrity as 




In the Netherlands, protection of tissue within bodies by means of the right for 
inviolability of the body was problematised when the Office of Public Prosecution 
wanted to apply the novel DNA fingerprint technique, as discussed with respect to the 
rape in disguise case. Therefore, the rape in disguise case can be considered a 
milestone for Dutch forensic DNA practices and their legal arrangements. By means 
of the Forensic DNA law it became a legal possibility to violate the insides of bodies 
to collect tissue for DNA typing. Because the use of force to obtain tissue was 
considered a serious violation of bodies, high thresholds were introduced initially. 
Later, by means of the 2001 amendment and the 2005 law, the categories of 
individuals whose bodies could be violated were expanded.36 By means of the law 
enacted in 2003 on external visible characteristics, and through the intensified use of 
the Dutch DNA database, forensic DNA practices received new applications. At first, 
DNA typing was used as evidence and for identifying purposes. Later, DNA typing 
was also considered as a tool for criminal investigation and the prevention of crimes. 
This paper aims to articulate the legal-normative concerns that accompany the 
applications of forensic DNA analysis.  
 
This paper places the suspect in the foreground, as the suspect’s body is an entry 
point to aid description of the re-articulation or re-negotiation of, in this case, the 
right to inviolability of the body. The right to inviolability of the body is a principle 
that protects the population at large from the authorities and their monopoly for using 
violence, for example torture. As more room has been given to forensic DNA 
practices, the possibilities for making an appeal to such legal principles have been 
reduced. As described above, the 1994 law stipulated that the tissue/ID-package 
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should be destroyed after a DNA fingerprint had been produced as a precautionary 
measure against misuse and abuse of tissue. By means of the 2001 amendment this 
warrant has been terminated. The tissue/ID-package is now to be stored for a 20 or 30 
year period.  
 
One would expect that the storage of the tissue/ID-package for two or three decades 
has been firmly legally arranged. This paper shows that the legal arrangements for 
dealing with the tissue/ID-package itself are at fault. In the process of making legal 
evidence convincing, a chain of evidence is compiled. The tissue/ID-package is part 
of that chain of evidence. The function of the tissue/ID-package is to keep tissue and 
information about the donor’s identity together, and hence the obtained tissue still is 
an indivisible part of the donor’s body with claims to bodily integrity. As a result, one 
would expect that the tissue/ID-package is subject to a legal framework that protects 
bodily integrity. This is not the case in current Dutch forensic DNA practices, as the 
legal concept of the right to inviolability of the body has been understood as the right 
not to be touched by the authorities except such as is by or pursuant to Act of 
Parliament. Currently the tissue/ID-package is protected by the legal concept of 
privacy. Privacy has not been articulated as to protect body parts of identifiable 
individuals but to protect personal life, therefore the legal framework of privacy no 
longer suffices the protection of the tissue/ID-package.37 A solution to this problem is 
to articulate bodily integrity as a legal concept that governs the protection of body 
parts, e.g. the tissue/ID-package, outside of bodies. 
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